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(e) appeal to prurient interest, or absence thereof, in advertising or
other promotion of the material.
Expert testimony of the author, creator or publisher relating to factors
entering into the determination of the issue of obscenity shall be admissible.
The effect of such legislation would be to wipe out the test of
obscenity established in R. v. Hicklin 0 and honoured by ninety years'
application. The offence would no longer arise from the tendency of
the material to corrupt or deprave the morals of those into whose hands
the material might fall, but rather the offence would arise from the
appeal of the material itself, without reference to its effect on anybody.
Furthermore, the accused would no longer be under a burden to prove
that the work served the public good, as is now required by Section
150 (3) of The Criminal Code; instead, expert evidence would be
admissible to establish the merit of the work. Also, the motive of an
accused would be relevant, in direct contrast to the present Section 150
(5) of The Criminal Code, although the draft legislation goes on to
put the burden of proving that the dissemination was non-criminal on
the accused, and defines this as:
(a) dissemination, not for gain, to personal associates other than chil-
dren under sixteen;
(b) dissemination, not for gain, by an actor below -the age of 21 to a
child not more than five years younger than the actor; and
(c) dissemination, to institutions or individuals having scientific or other
special justification for possessing such material."
It will be observed that the whole tone of the proposed legislation
is more civilized and tolerant than that of The Criminal Code. Pending
some change such as the above in the existing Canadian legislation, it
is submitted that the best than can be done is to follow the suggestions
of Dr. Mohr. For the present, the suppression of obscene literature can
best be carried out by co-operation between the Crown and the publish-
ing and distributing industry, not by arbitrary censorship, but by a
reasoned attempt to determine what is obscene and to withdraw it from
circulation with a minimum of sensationalism. MALCOLM KROMBIE.*
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY-OVERT ACTS OUTSIDE JURISDICTION.-
In the New York conspiracy case of The People v. Hines,' counsel for the
defense stated that "Prosecutors love to have conspiracy indictments
because under them you can admit almost the kitchen sink". People's
counsel tartly replied: "The charge is conspiracy which, I believe,
counsel said prosecutors love to use. Well, it is one of those very ancient
and honourable institutions derived from the Anglo-Saxon law under
which we are trying this case."2 Both statements contain elements of
truth.
A charge of conspiracy is particularly dangerous to anl accused
because the range of admissible material is greater than that which is
* Mr. Krombie is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
' 
0 See footnote 4 ante.
" See footnote 9 ante, section 207 (10) (3).
' (1940) 17 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 141.
2 Michael & Wechsler; Criminal Law and its Administration, (Chicago, 1940),
at p. 673.
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admissible on other charges. What otherwise might be hearsay evidence
is admissible against co-conspirators.
Conspiracy is a method of attacking conduct which has not yet
reached the solicitation or attempt stages, but which already contains
some element that is considered dangerous or objectionable to society as
a whole or to individuals in society. United States federal law requires
proof of some overt act (short of an. attempt) to constitute an indictable
conspiracy.3 The recent case, Board of Trade v. Owen,4 represents a move
by the House of Lords in the direction adopted by the United States
federal courts, toward a limitation upon the broad scope of conspiracy.
In the Owen case, the facts were these: The German Government's
policy was to refuse licenses for the export of strategic metal to Eastern
Europe. To circumvent this, Owen and others bought metal in Germany
and presented false documents to the Government licensing agency,
showing that the metal would be exported to, and used in, Ireland.
Their scheme was to ship the metals to Russia. A charge of conspiracy
to defraud was laid. The accused were English; they had not left
England during the transaction. The representation took place in
Germany, and the license was issued in Germany. All overt acts took
place abroad.
The House of Lords admitted that there was no doubt that the acts
done resulted in someone acting to his detriment; here the Government
Department issuing the license enabled something to be done which the
Department was charged with a duty to prevent. Lord Tucker, speaking
for the court, said, ". . . I have no doubt that they (the facts) disclose a
conspiracy which would be indictable here if the acts designed to be done
and the object to be achieved were in this country".' Later His Lordship
stated that criminal law was concerned with the maintenance of law and
order within the realm., It is submitted that at common law the offense
of conspiracy took place "within the realm".
In criminal law it seems universally accepted that the agreement
is the crime and that no overt act is necessary for the offense. It is
not necessary to show that the conspiracy has resulted in prejudice to
any one, as required in civil conspiracy." In Mulcahy v. Regina8 Willes
J., in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated: "A conspiracy consists
not merely in the intention of the two or more but in the agreement
of the two or more to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by
unlawful means." Thus the means and the object of an agreement must
be examined. If either are criminal, an agreement to perform them, even
without overt acts, is criminal. At common law, even if the contemplated
3 Hyde v. United States (1912) 225 U.S. 347, at p. 359.
4 [1957] 2 W.L.R. 351.
5Ibid. at p. 355.
6 Ibid. at p. 358.7 Crofter Harris Tweed v. Veitch [1942] 1 AR E.R. 142.
8 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 306.
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acts, presuming a lawful object, are illegal-as distinguished from
criminal-it would seem that the conspiracy still would be one for
which an indictment would lie. According to Cockburn C.J.: "It is not
necessary in order to constitute a conspiracy that the acts agreed to
be done should be acts which if done would be criminal. It is enough
if the acts agreed to be done, although not criminal, are wrongfull."'
In the Owen case Lord Tucker admitted that on the facts there would
have been an indictable conspiracy had the means and the object been
within England. The crux of the matter is that the means and the
object were to take place outside Great Britain. Hence the conspiracy
was not punishable within the realm. It is submitted that the common
law doctrine of conspiracy does not dictate this conclusion, nor does
the comity of nations recommend it.
The common law principles of conspiracy are stated by Dr. Glanville
Williams as follows: "There need be no overt act beyond the making
of the agreement. The crime of conspiracy is completely committed, if
it is committed at all, the moment two or more have agreed that they
will do certain things."'10 Archibold's Criminal Pleadings," suggests
that a conspiracy entered into in England to do abroad that which
would be a crime in England appears to be indictable in England.
Similarly in Smith v. United States,12 the Court held that a conspirator
could be tried at either the place where the agreement was entered into,
or where the overt act was committed. Admittedly the overt acts are
put in evidence in many of the English and American conspiracy cases,
but it is submitted that this is merely to show if and where the inchoate
offense took place, so as to confer jurisdiction upon the proper forum.
In the Owen case the conspiracy, in its traditional sense, was completed
in England. The fact that overt acts occurred in Germany should not
affect the question of indictability. The offense occurred "within the
realm" as Lord Tucker required. Even if the offense is deemed not to
be within the realm the comity of nations demands punishment. In
pointing out that United Kingdom courts should take notice of the laws
of a friendly country, Denning L.J. said, "The courts of one country
should not help break the laws of another."' 3 Also there is obiter dicta
from Lord Tucker indicating that there would have been a different
decision had some public mischief resulted from the performance of the
contemplated acts. It might be said that there is a public mischief in
the Owen Case.
The Owen case represents a departure from the traditional common
law view of conspiracy and leans to the United States view that the overt
act is significant in the offense of conspiracy. One anomalous aspect of
the situation is that what was originally criminal conspiracy may now
9Regina v. Warburton (1870) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 274, at p. 276.
1o Glanville Williams; Criminal Law (London 1953), at p. 512.
"Archibolds Criminal Pleadings, 33rd edition, at p. 1481.
12 (1937) 92 F. (2d) 460.
13 Regazzoni v. K. C. Sethia [1956] 2 All E.R. 487, at p. 490.
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be defended by showing that the accused committed the contemplated
wrongful act in another jurisdiction.
DAVID THOMPSON *
MATRIMONIAL HOME-UNEQUAL CONTRIBUTION-DIVORCF,-DETERMINA-
TION OF INTEREST OF H. AND W.-In the recent English case of Fribance
v. Fribance1 the facts were that H. and W. married in 1933. They be-
came tenants of a house in 1940, at which time they had two children.
H. then joined the R.A.F. The only money sent to his family was the
compulsory allotment. Later, an additional family allowance was added
to his pay. H. wrote to W. stating that in order to build up a family
savings account, he would keep the new allowance and send home only
the compulsory payment. W. agreed; she was to go to work, feed clothe,
and house the family from her own income. When, in 1946, H. returned,
he had saved £260. He began turning the bulk of this over to W., who
continued working. In 1950 H. purchased the leasehold in his own name.
W. only contributed £20. In 1952 W. obtained a divorce. She made appli-
cation under sec. 17 of The Married Women's Property Act, 1882,2. The
Registrar held that W.'s interest in the leasehold was limited to the
£20 that she had contributed personally. It was held on appeal, however,
that each was entitled to a one-half interest. The Court of Appeal stated
that the conduct of the parties showed that their spendings and savings
were for common family benefits.
It was argued that W. would have to prove a legal contract to
succeed, and that if no contract was established, the court must fall
back upon the "savings from housekeeping" case of Blackwell v. Black-
well.3 In discussion of this point Denning L.J. said:
I do not think that line of argument is valid today. A wife is not to be put
to the proof of a contract or gift as if she were a stranger. Romer L.J. made
that clear in Rimmer v. Rimmer when he said that "cases between husband
and wife ought not to be governed by the same strict considerations, both
at law and in equity, as are commonly applied to the ascertainment of the
respective rights of strangers". I fully agree with .that observation and I
think it is -the correct way of approaching these cases at the present day.4
Denning L.J. applied Rimmer v. Rimmerl as follows:
I put, therefore, the question of contract, gift or trust on one side, and
apply the law as laid down in Rimmer v. Rimmer, supra, and Cobb v. Cobb,(1955) 1 W.L.R. 731; (1955) 2 All E.R. 696, which I take to be this: If it is
clear that the property . . . was -intended to belong .to the one or other
absolutely . . . or that they intended to hold it on definite shares, ...
then effect must be given to their intention...
In many cases, however, the intention of the parties is not clear for the
simple reason that they never formed an intention: so the court has to
attribute an intention to them. This is particularly the case with the family
assets, by which I mean the things intended to be a continuing provision
* Mr. Thompson, a graduate of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, is in
the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 (1957) 1 W.L.R. 384.
2 See The Married Women's Property Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 223, s. 12 (2).
3 (1943) 2 All E.R. 579.
4 See footnote 1 ante at p. 387.
5 (1953) 1 Q.B. 63.
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